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E A R L Y IN 1874 A PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND newspaper declared banking to be 
"the breath of life to commerce". The condition of financial institutions, stated 
the Daily Examiner, "as surely indicates the health of the commercial body to 
the financier, as the pulsations at the wrist of his patient indicate the health of 
the physical man to his medical adviser".1 In that year, Charlottetown was 
served by three local banks administered by the local business elite. The first 
Island bank had been incorporated in 1856. The last local bank was amal-
gamated with the Canadian Bank of Commerce in 1906. A study of the eco-
nomic policies of these institutions and the reasons for the demise of local bank-
ing sheds light on the role of indigenous entrepreneurs in promoting economic 
growth on Prince Edward Island in this period. 
Currency shortages were common complaints in all young colonies where im-
ports generally exceeded exports. The unsatisfactory state of local currencies 
and the need for a dependable source of credit spurred the establishment of local 
banks in early 19th-century North America.2 These factors also prevailed in 
Prince Edward Island, where the chronic shortage of an adequate medium of ex-
change particularly hindered trade. As rapidly as Island agricultural produce, 
timber, and ships earned needed cash, imported manufactured and consumer 
goods drained the colony of its specie. In 1813 for example, Governor Charles 
Smith deemed the want of specie one of the colony's most prominent economic 
evils. Forty years later, Lieutenant-Governor Alexander Bannerman com-
plained that much of the Island's trade was confined to truck and barter due to 
the lack of circulating medium.3 Without a bank to issue bills of exchange or 
bank drafts, Island importers had to pay cash for their goods. The resulting 
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dearth of specie not only retarded trade, but also prevented individuals from 
carrying on daily transactions.4 
Cash shortages also adversely affected the colonial treasury. A large portion 
of the Island's revenue consisted of custom duties, but since business was chiefly 
conducted by credit, the government had to grant merchants three to 12 months 
credit on their dutiable goods. This delay in revenue receipts exacerbated the 
government's annual deficit, and led to the issue of treasury warrants at 
irregular intervals.5 Unfortunately, Nova Scotia merchants purchased them at 
reduced rates, and then used the warrants to acquire Island grain and produce 
at a virtual discount. Thus in 1836 the Colonial Secretary stated that the 
warrants had "a direct tendency to banish specie from the Island".6 Treasury 
notes had similarly deleterious consequences. First issued by the government in 
1791 to help finance the budget deficit and to facilitate small retail transactions, 
the notes circulated in units as small as one shilling and were legal tender for all 
public transactions. At first, the notes greased the wheels of commerce, but 
ultimately they depreciated the value of the Island's currency and led to infla-
tion. Additionally, according to the British Treasury, the government's decision 
to issue notes and warrants prevented the creation of private banking institu-
tions, for the issuance of notes usually constituted a bank's most profitable func-
tion. The Imperial government thus pressured the colony to restrict its paper 
currency.7 
The scarcity of specie prompted numerous public and private experiments and 
the Island soon became a fertile field for various types of currency. Spanish 
dollars and British coinage were the only legal specie on the Island, but by 
common consent the public accepted American, Spanish, Mexican, Peruvian, 
Central American, French, Dutch, and Irish coins.8 The Spanish silver dollar 
circulated as one of the most common coins on Prince Edward Island. However, 
it had a greater value in Halifax than in the debtor region of Charlottetown, and 
tended to move to the mainland. To prevent this loss, and to augment the 
amount of currency in circulation, Governor Smith ordered the centres punched 
out of 1,000 Spanish silver dollars in 1813, to make them unacceptable else-
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where. The outer ring, termed the "holey dollar", was valued at five shillings, 
whereas the centre piece passed for one shilling. Unfortunately, the punch was 
too large, and the centre pieces were worth more than one shilling. Other sugges-
tions included making local produce such as fish, grain, and lumber legal tender, 
and using copper coins or light tokens minted in Great Britain.9 
Several merchants issued their own promissory notes in lieu of currency. The 
prospect of proliferating private notes alarmed local merchants, who feared that 
the promissory notes might prove worthless or precipitate further devaluations 
of Island currency. Thus in 1836 "An Act to restrain the Issue of certain Pro-
missory Notes" legalized the notes and enabled their bearers to sue the issuer in 
case of non-payment. This regulation restrained the issuance of private notes, 
and encouraged people to accept those promissory notes that were issued. Three 
years later, the Legislative Council defeated a bill to prohibit all private notes, 
believing the Assembly was trying to undermine Samuel Cunard, a large absen-
tee landowner whose notes circulated widely on the Island.10 
The bewildering array of coins on the Island further complicated the mone-
tary situation. The Imperial Parliament several times broached the idea of 
developing a common monetary system for British North America, but its plans 
always foundered on colonial jealousies, the problem of discharging existing 
debts, and the competition between British Sterling and the American dollar.11 
Lacking a fixed exchange rate, local traders and foreign merchants viewed the 
chances of the colony's future economic development pessimistically. An 
obvious solution was to create a local banking system. "To the Commercial 
Community", the British Treasury wrote in 1854, "such an Establishment 
would be of indescribable advantage, not only in performing all the functions of 
Banking...but also in furnishing the means of making remittances and conduct-
ing their foreign Exchanges, the want of all of which they now feel so much: and 
for which they have only to blame the tampering of the Government with the 
circulation".12 
Prior to the advent of banks, the merchants acted as bankers for each other by 
providing credit and discounting each others' paper. As most businesses were 
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either self-financed or family-owned, expansion proceeded from retained 
savings. As the economy expanded, however, the demand for capital often out-
stripped individual resources, and borrowers had to find willing lenders. 
Wealthy shipowners such as James Peake might await the construction and sale 
of a ship before demanding repayment. Yet losses from endorsing personal 
notes could end in bankruptcy, as was the case with Charlottetown auctioneer 
William Dodd.13 The chronic shortage of funds, and the high risk of the expand-
ing shipbuilding industry, meant that many loans were contracted at usurious 
rates. "Those of us who are in trade", stated Charlottetown merchant and ship-
owner W.W. Lord, "know the value of it [bank loans], and if we cannot be 
accommodated by a bank, we must go to a private individual for it, and if he is 
not a particular friend, the probability is you will get pretty closely shaved".14 
Wholesalers and retailers normally granted their customers from three to six 
months' credit, but if these merchants (especially the wholesalers) had to wait 
until the loan matured, a considerable part of their capital would be tied up in 
unproductive uses. The merchants needed a regularly available supply of work-
ing capital to finance the purchase of imported cargoes, to transport goods from 
producers to consumers, and to hold inventories until they were sold. By dis-
counting promissory notes, a bank would enable businessmen to bridge the time 
between sale and maturation.15 
Unlike the experience of the other Maritime colonies, these currency prob-
lems did not immediately lead to the creation of a provincial bank in Prince 
Edward Island. By the 1850s time was ripe for the establishment of a bank in 
that colony. The Crimean War had created a demand for North American 
agricultural produce, and the signing of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United 
States in 1854 provided a market for Island fish and other natural resources. 
Shipbuilding was also on the rise: more than 900 vessels were constructed on the 
Island during the decade, and the local fleet increased from 192 vessels in 1840 
to 309 vessels in 1855.16 This prosperity was reflected in the rapid growth in pop-
ulation from 32,300 people in 1833 to 71,500 people in 1855. The emergence of a 
domestic entrepreneurial class that required large amounts of capital and read-
ily available accommodation, made banking facilities a necessity. As part-time 
shipowner W.W. Lord asserted in the House of Assembly, "every man in busi-
ness feels the inconvenience and annoyance to which the community is subjected 
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for want of a bank".17 The situation was so severe that the funds gathered in the 
Island Patriotic Fund for the Crimean War lay idle for the want of reliable 
drafts.18 
In the spring of 1854, James Peake and eight other prominent merchants and 
shipowners sponsored a private bill in the Legislative Assembly to incorporate a 
joint-stock banking company. Although the local "Family Compact" had 
drafted the bill, both political parties supported it, and the Assembly waived the 
normal private incorporation fee inasmuch as the bank would "promote the 
interests of all classes".19 Several of its provisions, however, sparked consider-
able discussion. Some rural representatives feared that the bank would monop-
olize the money market and charge whatever interest rates it pleased. The pros-
pect of having the Island's monetary system controlled by a few Charlottetown 
merchants was also unsatisfactory. Representatives of both Houses met several 
times before an acceptable compromise was reached. The cost of each share was 
reduced from £30 to £10 to allow men of relatively limited means to invest in the 
bank and to make the institution less liable to a run in hard times. The number 
of directors was increased from four to seven, the government was granted 
authority to inspect the bank's books, and shareholders became liable for double 
their share holdings.20 On 1 May 1854, the Bank of Prince Edward Island Act 
passed the legislature and was sent to Great Britain. 
Unfortunately, in drafting the bill the colonial politicians had ignored the Im-
perial government's regulations for chartered banks, especially those concerning 
shareholders' obligations and liabilities. The British Treasury carefully perused 
the bill, objected to approximately three-quarters of it, and as the bank would 
"have a great effect upon the future trade of the colony", refused to grant royal 
assent.21 When the Treasury transmitted its detailed regulations and conditions 
for incorporating colonial banking companies, Island politicians swallowed 
their pride and revised the bank bill accordingly. Once again the British Trea-
sury objected — this time to some ambiguous phraseology regarding limitations 
on real estate holdings — and the incorporation of the Bank of Prince Edward 
Island was further delayed until 14 April 1856. After one-half of the bank's 
capital was paid up, the Bank of Prince Edward Island opened its doors four 
months later.22 
The first directors were drawn from the ranks of the Island's Family Com-
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20 Assembly Journal, 1855, Appendix J; Haszard's Gazette, 14 April 1855. For a detailed examina-
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pact, and the bank's shareholders represented a "who's who" of the Island's 
economic and political elite. The Dun and Bradstreet records of five of the 
bank's early directors suggest the economic standing of the institution's ex-
ecutive: 
James Peake: Wealthiest merchant here. Stands far ahead of any of our 
merchants. Estimated worth £100,000. One of the Island's largest ship-
owners. Treasurer Charlottetown Gas and Light Company. 
Richard Heartz: Wholesaler and tanner. Becoming one of our first men of 
wealth. A man of extensive means. Estimated worth £30,000 to £40,000. 
Daniel Davies: Part-time shipowner, insurance agent, President of Steam 
Navigation Company, and director of Charlottetown Gas and Light Com-
pany. Our first retailer. Holds $2,000 in real estate. 
Henry Haszard: Part-time shipowner, wholesaler, general merchant. 
Large real estate investments and grain shipments to Great Britain. 
Estimated worth $20 to $30 thousand. 
Daniel Brenan: Leading merchant. Part-time shipowner, retail merchant, 
land surveyor. President Charlottetown Gas and Light Company.23 
Not one of the 116 individuals who purchased the 3,000 shares was a labourer. 
Four per cent were tradesmen, and ten per cent were farmers. More than half 
the shareholders were Charlottetonians. These proportions remained constant 
for the life of the bank.24 The Bank of Prince Edward Island was a rapid 
success. In the first year of operation, notes in circulation rose from £9,000 to 
£38,000, and total assets more than doubled from £30,700 to £72,100. Thanks to 
an active discounting market, the bank made a £2,400 profit, and in June 1857 
declared an 8 per cent dividend. The drop in out-of-province bank notes from 
£135,000 in 1856 to £22,500 two years later, also illustrates the public's accep-
tance of this institution.25 
The bank's success was closely related to its discounting and exchange 
services, operations dependent upon the Island's exporting market. The colony's 
shipbuilding and agricultural industries relied heavily upon the British and 
American markets. Late in 1857, however, crop failures abroad created an 
economic recession that rapidly enveloped first Britain, then the United States, 
and finally British North America. Emulating other Canadian lending institu-
tions, the Bank of P.E.I, restricted discounting to its best customers in order to 
23 Dun and Bradstreet, various files, 1854-1863. 
24 Share List, May 1856, Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, PAPEI; Haszard's Gazette, 14 April 1855. 
25 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 1857; McCullough, Money and Exchange, p. 203. 
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prevent cash outlays from exceeding incoming currency.26 Although the discount 
rate rose from 7½ to 9 per cent, the increase in foreign remittances further 
drained the bank's specie supply. When local weather conditions prevented 
farmers from bringing their produce to market, and the shipping and timber 
trades hit bottom, many borrowers declared bankruptcy. Monthly profits, 
which had never dipped below £370, declined to £133 in December 1857, where-
upon the Bank of P.E.I, closed its doors.27 
The bank's misfortune could also be attributed to poor management, or to 
what James Peake identified as "incautious proceedings".28 Unknown to the 
other directors, Ralph Brecken, the bank's president, and William Cundall, the 
cashier, had loaned more than double the bank's capital to one London ship-
building company with only its unfinished vessels as security.29 When this firm 
failed, the bank discovered it was overextended. The news shocked the Island 
business community. James Peake, for example, had considered the Bank of 
P.E.I, the "safest in America", while H.J. Cundall, the cashier's son, had 
written to friends in November 1857 that he would be glad to possess more than 
his 40 shares in the bank, so highly were they rated on the market.30 
At the news of the bank's troubles, depositors rushed to withdraw their 
money; those holding bank notes sought to convert them into specie, and 
merchants refused to accept the bank's currency. To protect their dwindling 
specie reserve, the bank's directors requested government permission to suspend 
specie payment until the panic subsided. Although the treasury refused this 
request, it agreed to bolster sagging public confidence in the bank by continuing 
to accept bank notes in payment for customs duties and other obligations. As 
the run on the bank continued unabated, the directors resorted to its charter, 
which allowed suspension for up to three months. All financial transactions were 
suspended.31 During the winter, James Peake helped the bank reorganize its 
finances. He loaned the directors £500 and promised an additional £3500 within 
six months. In addition, Peake persuaded several London banks to loan needed 
specie to the bank. Although some shareholders remained dispirited and wished 
to wind up the bank's affairs, the annual stockholders' meeting in March 1858 
decided to re-open in view of the institution's "vital importance to this com-
munity and the Island at large".32 William Cundall remained as cashier, but the 
president, Ralph Brecken, stepped down. Daniel Hodgson, one of the bank's 
26 Brecken to Peake, 7 September 1857, Peake-Brecken Papers, PAPEI. 
27 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 1858; Examiner, 30 November 1857. 
28 Peake to Moore, 30 December 1857, Peake-Brecken Papers, PAPEI. 
29 Peake to Moore, 10 December 1857, Item 882, ibid.; The Monetary Times and Trade Review -
Insurance Chronicle (Montreal), 18 October 1878. 
30 Peake to Moore, 30 December 1857, Peake-Brecken Papers, PAPEI; Cundall to J.H., 30 
November 1857, H.J. Cundall Papers, PAPEI. 
31 The People's Journal (Charlottetown), 12 December 1857; Examiner, 18 January 1858; Prince 
Edward Island Executive Council Minutes, 8 December 1857, M566, PAPEI. 
32 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 2 March 1858. 
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directors, who felt personally disgraced by the bank's problems and was 
ashamed to be seen on the streets, declined re-election.33 
The succeeding year witnessed cautious retrenchment. The bank reduced 
loans from 90 to 60 days, contracted remittances, and sold the land and ships 
acquired from the bank's defaulters. That fall, good harvests and a ready Amer-
ican export market brought improved financial conditions, and the Bank of 
P.E.I, declared an eight per cent dividend. Dun and Bradstreet's rating im-
proved from "perfectly safe" to "good and strong", and H.J. Cundall purchased 
an additional £400 in bank stock and advised a London widow to do the same.34 
In 1860 the bank resumed dividend payments. 
This renewed success reflected the Island's general prosperity. An expanding 
population, good local harvests, and excellent United States markets stimulated 
agriculture, fishing, and shipbuilding. The chance to emulate the success of the 
Bank of Prince Edward Island, and the need to accommodate the expanding 
economy more efficiently, prompted the creation of four additional banks 
between 1862 and 1871. This expansion coincided with the general banking 
boom in British North America, where the number of banks proliferated from 
29 in 1863 to 51 in 1874.35 
In 1862 Father Georges-Antoine Belcourt established the Farmers' Bank of 
Rustico to serve the needs of the Acadian population in the area. The purpose of 
this cooperative institution, as outlined in the Vindicator, was "to afford those 
farmers, who are in backward circumstances, the opportunity of procuring seed-
grain, etc., at a more moderate rate than that at which they were heretofore 
obliged to buy them, as well as to enable those who have any money to spare to 
invest their savings in a profitable manner".36 Despite trepidations concerning 
its diminutive size and capitalization (£1,200 compared to £30,000 for the Bank 
of P.E.I.), the Farmers' Bank was incorporated with little opposition.37 
The establishment of another bank in Charlottetown two years later, how-
ever, met considerable resistance from the directors and shareholders of the 
Bank of P.E.I. The promoters of the Union Bank declared that another finan-
cial institution was needed to cater to the needs of the expanding economy. The 
Charlottetown Examiner agreed, noting that increased population and growing 
agricultural exports "have rendered further banking operations in this Island 
33 Item 882, 10 December 1857, Peake-Brecken Papers, PAPEL 
34 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, March 1859; Cundall to Mrs. E. Hodges, 7 December 1858, 
Cundall Papers; Dun and Bradstreet, file # 123, p. 368. 
35 Neufeld, The Financial System of Canada, p. 78. 
36 The Vindicator (Charlottetown), 12 June 1862. 
37 Acadian farmers, who previously had paid 20 per cent interest rates to money lenders, could now 
borrow at 7 to 8 per cent. Within three years the bank returned a 10 per cent dividend: J.T. 
Croteau, "The Farmers' Bank of Rustico: An Early People's Bank", Dalhousie Review, 
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absolutely necessary".38 The Islander also believed that responsibility for the 
Island's monetary system exceeded the capacity of a bank with a paid-up capital 
of only £30,000, and suggested that the colony's fiscal responsibility be divided 
between two banks.39 Perhaps the real motive behind the decision to create a 
second bank in Charlottetown was the proclivity of bank directors to promote 
their own and their friends' business ventures.40 The Bank of P.E.I, was sup-
ported by "all the monied men in the country" and run by the leading business-
men in the capital.41 These, and other directors of the Old Bank, as it was now 
called, sometimes stood accused of favouring the bank's shareholders, and re-
fusing to discount bills held by those residing outside the capital — thus forcing 
them into using the services of private discounters at exorbitant interest rates.42 
Prior to 1865, more than half the Old Bank's directors were shipbuilders, and 
since this industry required sizable capital, the bank could not accommodate 
everyone. Certainly, its monopolization by a select group of businessmen posed 
a major source of concern for many Island merchants, and no doubt fathered the 
1864 bill to incorporate the Union Bank. Indeed, the Union Bank subsequently 
conducted more of its business in the countryside than did the Bank of P.E.I. 
Most of the new bank's directors were hardware and dry goods merchants, while 
fewer than one-third were shipbuilders. 
The directors of the Old Bank were determined to monopolize the Charlotte-
town money market. Shortly after the Union Bank's petition appeared before 
the Legislature, the Bank of P.E.I, requested the government to double its capi-
tal stock to £60,000. The bank's charter empowered the institution to increase 
its stock by a majority vote of its shareholders within seven years of incorpora-
tion. This period had lapsed, and at the annual general meeting earlier that year 
the issue of expanding the bank's capital had not been broached. The Union 
Bank's petition, however, now had the directors hurrying to obtain the necessary 
votes to petition the government for an additional £30,000 capitalization.43 The 
Old Bank obviously believed that the monied class in Charlottetown would more 
likely invest in an established institution that had paid a 15 per cent dividend the 
previous year, than risk its investment in a new bank that might take several 
years to realize a profit.44 Despite the opposition of several polticians with shares 
in the Old Bank, the Legislature perceived the need for an additional bank, and 
rejected the Bank of P.E.I.'s request. The Union Bank opened for business in 
38 Examiner, 4 May 1863. 
39 The Islander, 12 June 1863. 
40 Ross Weekly (Charlottetown), 10 November 1864; R.T. Naylor, The History of Canadian 
Business, 1867-1914 (Toronto, 1975), Vol. I, p. 120. 
41 Peake to Brecken, 23 March 1857, Peake-Brecken Papers; Examiner, 1 March 1858; Prince 
Edward Island, Debates and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1863, pp. 46-48. 
42 Legislative Council Debates, 1863, p. 47; Islander, 12 June 1863; Parliamentary Reporter, 1857, 
pp. 44-45. 
43 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, March 1863. 
44 Legislative Council Debates, 1863, p. 48. 
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1864. 
Two years later, as the Island continued to prosper, additional banks became 
incorporated in Summerside, Souris, and Alberton, although only the Summer-
side bank came to fruition. Summerside had emerged in the 1850s as the second 
largest town in the colony, and the most important commercial centre for the 
western half of the Island. Charlottetown was too distant for day-to-day finan-
cial transactions. In addition, local pride, and suspicions that the directors of the 
two Charlottetown banks catered particularly to the merchants of the capital 
city, made a local bank desirable. The long list of prominent Summerside 
merchants and shipowners who supported the bill reflected the expected com-
mercial benefits of the bank.45 In 1871 Prince Edward Island was still riding the 
crest of world-wide prosperity, augmented by the construction of a railway 
across the Island, and the fifth and final local bank opened its doors. As the pre-
amble to the incorporating act for the Merchants Bank of Prince Edward Island 
explained, "the increasing trade and wealth of this Island necessitate the estab-
lishment of an additional Bank at Charlottetown".46 The Merchants Bank 
charter resembled the other Charlottetown banks in everything but liability, 
which was set at triple rather than the normal double liability. 
The Island banks' powers and liabilities resembled the charters of other 
British North American banks, which meant that they reflected the mother 
country's banking practices and the dictates of the British Treasury and Board 
of Trade. The charters included clauses protecting the public against question-
able banking practices and preventing power from accumulating in a few hands. 
The paid-up capital, for example, was divided into shares of £10 each to 
"accommodate men of small means".47 No individual could purchase more than 
40 shares until the offer had been in effect for three months, and at no time was 
any person to own more than 20 per cent of any bank's stock. Additionally, the 
charters limited shareholders' voting power by allotting votes in a ratio that 
decreased the influence of large shareholders and set an individual's maximum 
number of votes at 15. To encourage careful management, stockholders were 
liable for double their investment, and if the bank collapsed, the shareholders 
might lose their initial payment, plus an amount equivalent to the price they had 
paid for their stock. The 7 elected directors of each bank were not eligible to 
serve on the board of another bank. Debts (excluding deposits) were not to ex-
ceed three times the paid-up capital, and if specie payments were suspended 
more than 90 days the bank forfeited its privileges. Finally, due probably to the 
public's fear of the influence of an all-powerful financial institution, the govern-
ment limited each charter to 21 years.48 
45 The list included Robert and James Holman, John Lefurgey, James Yeo, James Muirhead, 
David Rogers, and Charles Green. 
46 Statutes of Prince Edward Island, 1871, Cap. 71, p. 76. 
47 Haszard's Gazette, 14 April 1855. 
48 See R.C.B. Risk, "The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in 
Ontario", University of Toronto Law Journal, XXIII (1973), p. 283. 
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The Island banks wielded political as well as economic power in the com-
munity. An analysis of the personnel of the Bank of P.E.I.'s board of directors 
between 1856 and 1881 reveals that at one time or another, 40 per cent served as 
justices of the peace, 25 per cent were elected to the provincial government, and 
two directors officiated as mayors of Charlottetown. Although the Union 
Bank's directors were not nearly so prominent in public affairs, they were not 
without some influence. During the Confederation debates in 1872-1873, for 
instance, the president of the Union Bank, unable to sell the colony's railway 
debentures in Britain, met with the Executive Council, and, according to F.W.P. 
Bolger, the pressure of this official and other Island bankers was important in 
convincing the government to re-open negotiations with Canada.49 The Mer-
chants Bank was even more influential. One-fifth of its 36 directors were elected 
to municipal office, and one-third sat in the Legislature. This included Premiers 
L.C. Owen (1873-1876), L.H. Davies (1876-1879), Donald Farquharson 
(1898-1901), J.H. Peters (1901-1908) and F.L. Haszard (1908). 
As Table One illustrates, the 1860s and early 1870s were profitable years for 
the Island banks, and these institutions generally applauded themselves for their 
thrifty, conservative fiscal policies. Unfortunately, 19th-century banking prac-
tices often accentuated the ups and downs of economies based upon staple ex-
ports. When the demand for Island produce in foreign markets declined, the 
banks responded by restricting loans. This fiscal conservatism merely triggered 
another downturn, which made it more difficult to reverse the trend. When times 
were good, credit was so readily available that speculation became the order of 
the day.50 In addition, all three Charlottetown banks hesitated to lend small 
sums to everyone who desired money, even if the loans were well-secured. The 
1870 minute book of the Old Bank, for example, noted that since the institution 
had made large advances to several wholesalers, it had limited loans to the "gen-
eral public". These problems were partly overcome when the Union Bank estab-
lished branches in Summerside and Alberton in 1899, and in Montague in 1897, 
and the Merchants Bank decided to open an office in the shipbuilding centre of 
Georgetown in 1875. 
In his controversial work on Canadian business, R.T. Naylor has argued that 
by favouring short-term loans over long-term credit, and by refusing to finance 
manufacturing industries, Central Canadian banks seriously retarded Canadian 
economic growth. Non-Halifax based Maritime banks, however, did not con-
form to these practices. Dominated by local entrepreneurs, Naylor wrote, these 
banks actively promoted both commercial and industrial development.51 The 
evidence available on Prince Edward Island banking tends to support Naylor's 
latter assertion. 
On the Bank of Prince Edward Island's 25th anniversary in 1881, the direc-
49 F.W.P. Bolger, Canada's Smallest Province (Charlottetown, 1973), p. 208. 
50 "Despatches from U.S. Consuls", 15 June 1883, PAPEI; Examiner, 13 September 1883. 
51 Naylor, The History of Canadian Business, Vol. I, pp. 110, 118, 125. 
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tors reported proudly that the bank had been "instrumental in...advancing the 
commercial and industrial interests, and developing the resources of the Pro-
vince at large".52 In the absence of records of who applied for loans and who 
were rejected, the precise lending practices of Island banks are difficult to deter-
mine. The documents generated by the liquidation of the Bank of Prince Edward 
Island between 1882 and 1887, however, provide an insight into the policies of 
the oldest Charlottetown bank.53 When the bank suspended specie payments, it 
had 410 depositors. Of this number, 50 lived out-of-province and were owed 
three per cent of the bank's total debt. Fifty-seven per cent of the debt was pay-
able to 120 Charlottetown residents, and the remaining 40 per cent was owed to 
250 people widely scattered throughout the province. The large number of de-
positors from outside the capital suggests that the bank's influence extended 
throughout the Island. 
The bank's investments included many industrial and commercial enterprises. 
In the 1879 annual report, the directors acknowledged shipbuilding to be the 
Island's "great branch of trade". It was therefore to be expected that the bank's 
largest accounts were with such wealthy shipbuilders and owners as J.C. Pope, 
the Peake brothers, the McDonald brothers, William Welsh, and Daniel Davies. 
At a number of mortgage sales, the liquidators disposed of five fishing boats, 
three barques, two brigantines, one brig, and one schooner. The banks also dis-
pensed sizable loans to wholesalers and shippers dealing in agricultural produce 
and canned goods destined for Great Britain and the West Indies, as well as to 
local grocers, lawyers, druggists, and hardware merchants. Additionally, the 
bank held land mortgages in at least one-third of the townships in the province, 
and had issued a large number of loans to numerous industrial firms throughout 
the Maritimes, including the Steam Navigation Company, a brewery, and the 
Acadia Coal Company. Shedd and Moore's new starch factory held one of the 
largest overdrafts. In fact, when the province's first two starch factories began 
operations in 1881, the Old Bank had extended credit to both of them, despite 
warnings from some quarters of their speculative nature.54 Lobster canning 
factories also benefitted by the bank's lending policies. Five canning factories 
owed money to the Old Bank - one more than $100,000. If the Bank of Prince 
Edward Island was representative, then Island banks invested widely and 
assisted all sectors of the province's economy. 
Despite the promising auguries of the 1860s and the early 1870s, between 1878 
and 1883 one Charlottetown bank liquidated, another amalgamated with the 
Bank of Nova Scotia, and a third institution nearly failed on two occasions. The 
same world economic conditions that had spurred the growth of local banking 
now hastened its decline. In 1873 a severe commercial depression engulfed Great 
Britain and the United States, reaching Central Canada that same year, and ex-
52 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 1 March 1881. 
53 Insolvency Minute Book, Series A, vol. 1, 1882, PAPEI; see also Saint John Globe, 3 December 
1881, for a list of the bank's creditors. 
54 Patriot (Charlottetown), 26 January 1882; Monetary Times (Montreal), 27 May 1881. 
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tending to the Maritimes in 1875. Prince Edward Island escaped the first years 
of the depression thanks to the continuing demand for grain in Europe and the 
infusion of Dominion funds resulting from the Island's entry into Confederation 
in 1873. By 1878, however, shipbuilding declined, and the depression was caus-
ing great losses and some major failures amongst the Island mercantile com-
munity. 
The first bank to feel the crunch, the Merchants Bank, might have escaped 
relatively unscathed from the depression had the directors followed sound bank-
ing practices. The board allowed one of the directors, J.F. Robertson, to ad-
vance most of the bank's resources to the shipbuilding firm of James Duncan 
and Company, of which he was a managing partner. This was an unwise finan-
cial decision, and in the midst of a severe depression, it was suicidal. The firm 
began experiencing trouble when Robertson ignored the advice of the company's 
agent in England and continued to promote business while relying on the Mer-
chants Bank to cover the company's loans. The directors failed to recognize the 
firm's problems until several British banks refused their drafts. As the Monetary 
Times concluded, the directors were "culpable in permitting one of their 
number, who, although clever, is a bold and self-willed man, to have all the 
money desired by the firm of which he was a ruling spirit to lock up in ships".55 
When the business community learned of the Duncan Company's failure, many 
of the bank's wealthier depositors immediately withdrew their funds, and on 10 
October 1878, the Merchants Bank suspended operations to protect its dwindl-
ing specie supply. Since March of that year, deposits had fallen from $247,000 
to $59,000, and total assets had declined from $650,000 to $420,000.56 Matters 
further deteriorated when one of Duncan's creditors fled the Island late at night, 
absconding with several securities on which the bank had first lien. 
Two months later the bank reopened its doors, thanks to the assistance of the 
other Charlottetown banks. The Union Bank transferred its City of Charlotte-
town account to the Merchants Bank, and the Bank of Prince Edward Island 
purchased 300 shares in the Merchants Bank. Also, the directors and share-
holders of the Merchants Bank contributed an additional $85,000 to the bank 
coffers. Its financial position, however, remained precarious. Two directors, in-
cluding J.F. Robertson, were not re-elected at the annual shareholders' meeting, 
and two others resigned immediately after being re-elected. The next year, the 
courts settled the Duncan estate at 32 cents per dollar, a loss for the bank of 
more than $150,000, or slightly more than the Merchant Bank's entire capital. 
To meet this crisis, the bank cut salaries in half, and realized a slight profit in 
1881.57 
Just when it seemed the Merchants Bank was on the road to recovery, the 
55 Monetary Times, 18, 25 October 1878. 
56 Ross, The Canadian Bank of Commerce, pp. 127, 492. 
57 Ibid., pp. 142, 143; Charlottetown City Council Minutes, 7 October 1878, Vol. 6, PAPEI; 
Examiner, 24 October 1878. 
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Bank of Prince Edward Island failed. The depression of the 1870s had also af-
fected the Old Bank. Gross profits, which had not dipped below $40,000 from 
1875 through 1878, fell to $23,000 in 1879 and to $17,000 the next year. Deposits de-
clined, the discount department was inactive, and the value of real estate held by 
the bank as security depreciated.58 The directors thus cautioned the cashier to 
limit future loans and to carefully check the customers' securities. Despite these 
problems, the Bank of Prince Edward Island was generally considered the safest 
investment on the Island. The business community was thus shocked when the 
bank suspended specie payments on 28 November 1881. 
The first hint of trouble appeared when the cashier, Joseph Brecken, departed 
for Saint John, New Brunswick, on 21 November and failed to return to work 
the following Monday. As Brecken explained to his wife: 
I know what people will say about me. I deserve it all and plead guilty. 
Where customers got the thin of the wedge in, I had to go on advancing in 
order...to get the whole monies due the bank back without loss. This every 
person promised to do. I had to keep these facts from the directors or I 
would have been dismissed from the bank. I therefore commenced my 
downward course by telling lies and ended by making false accounts.59 
A subsequent audit discovered that the bank had lost almost $300,000, with one 
outstanding account still to be calculated. For more than a year the cashier had 
deliberately deceived the directors. He had granted loans to customers whom the 
directors considered untrustworthy, recording these transactions in a secret bill 
book while continuing to take the regular bill book to the monthly meetings. 
After the board of directors had refused a $1,000 loan to Shedd and Moore 
Lobster Shippers, for example, Brecken granted them $42,000 the very next day. 
Although the directors had also ordered that John Hughes' liability to the bank 
should not exceed £4,000, the cashier's secret bill book for 1881 detailed ten 
entries over three months allocating more than £31,000 to Hughes. At other 
times, Brecken deceived the directors about a potential borrower's credit to pro-
vide him with additional discounting privileges. Each month the cashier pre-
sented the bank's overdrafts to the board for inspection, but here again Brecken 
omitted some names and reduced the apparent debts of others. When Brecken 
absconded, the bank held approximately $250,000 in 100 overdrafts, of 64 of 
which the directors knew nothing.60 The president's announcement that he would 
soon be checking the books in preparation for a semi-annual dividend distribu-
tion sparked the cashier's sudden departure. 
Although Brecken had deliberately deceived the board, several out-of-pro-
vince newspapers placed the bank's failure squarely on the directors' shoulders. 
58 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Books, 1878-1881, PAPEL 
59 Insolvency Minute Book, 1882, PAPEI. 
60 Examination of J. Longworth and Judge Hensley, 29 September 1882, ibid. 
44 Acadiensis 
As with recent banking scandals in Newark, Boston, Kansas, Toronto, Saint 
John, and Glasgow, Scotland, the losses were blamed on the directors' "culpable 
negligence", poor business practices, and the tendency to place too much trust in 
one person.61 H.J. Cundall, whose father had been the bank's cashier for 20 
years before he died in 1877, wrote to a colleague in Montreal that the bank's 
failure spoke "little for the intelligence or business capacity of the directors. I 
had no faith in them myself but the collapse came sooner & was more complete 
than I anticipated".62 The board of directors, in general, was not a particularly 
competent body in financial matters. Only one director knew much about 
accounting, and Joseph Hensley admitted he did not understand double entry 
bookkeeping. In addition, despite the worsening recession, the bank had con-
tinued distributing its profits in dividends, while allowing its reserves to decline. 
In fairness to the board of directors, in the past five years the bank had 
experienced an unusually rapid turnover in personnel. The death of the bank's 
cashier, William Cundall, was an important loss. His talents and integrity had 
contributed greatly to the institution's solid image, and the board had come to 
rely heavily upon his judgement. When Cundall's son declined the position, the 
directors appointed the assistant cashier Joseph Brecken, who had been with the 
bank for six months, following three years experience with the Bank of British 
North America in Halifax and Saint John. The previous year, Daniel Brenan, 
the bank's president, and George Moore, who had been the bank's teller since 
1856, had also died. Brenan was replaced as president by Judge Joseph Hensley, 
but in the fall of 1880 Hensley left for England to recover his health and John 
Longworth became acting president during the bank's crisis. 
This last change in leadership was most unfortunate. Hensley had been an 
extremely conscientious president. Each morning he went to the bank and took 
care of all foreign correspondence. Following this task, he consulted the Bill of 
Exchange Book and examined the credit of those who had purchased exchange. 
If the customer was unknown to the bank, the president telegraphed the Union 
Bank of London, or consulted the Dun and Wiman Mercantile Agency Refer-
ence Book. Hensley also checked the Circulation Book each week to ascertain 
who had overdue drafts, and hastened to initiate their collection. All overdrafts 
and discounts were laid before the directors at the monthly meeting for inspec-
tion and instruction.63 John Longworth was less diligent than his predecessor. He 
went to the bank "nearly every morning" to see if he was needed, but left the 
books to the cashier. Brecken thus carried on the bank's correspondence, pre-
pared the weekly balance sheets, and managed all exchange and fluctuations in 
circulating notes. The Circulation Book was not kept up after Judge Hensley left 
61 Monetary Times, 7 December 1881; Presbyterian Witness (Charlottetown), 7 December 1881. 
See also summaries of out-of-province newspaper reports in Examiner, 7 December 1881. 
62 Cundall to W.C. McDonald, 23 December 1881, Cundall to Mr. Frome, 30 November 1881, 
Cundall Letterbook, PAPEL 
63 In camera examination of Judge Hensley, Insolvency Minute Book, 1882, PAPEL 
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for England.64 As a result Brecken had been able to falsify the books for more 
than a year. 
The charter of the Bank of Prince Edward Island permitted the directors 90 
days' grace before resuming specie payments. Several groups of investigators 
estimated the bank's losses at $389,500 with one large account in England left to 
be valued, and the interested parties made plans to raise the necessary money to 
resume business. On 17 January 1882, most of the bank's creditors argreed to 
leave their deposits in the bank for three years at four per cent interest. Two 
weeks later, the directors offered to contribute $75,000, and the shareholders 
promised to pay $100,000 ($40 per share). These negotiations received general 
approval from all three levels of government, the other Island banks, and the 
province's leading businessmen.65 The bank's future now depended upon the 
willingness of the shareholders, depositors, and directors to live up to their 
agreement. By March, the directors had paid $67,000 of the agreed $75,000, and 
the shareholders had contributed $85,640 of the promised $100,000. The Daily 
Patriot pointed out that these payments "will no doubt entail great hardship 
upon very many. It will take away the greater part of their incomes from not a 
few, but it will save the Bank from ruin....The other alternative — liquidation, 
means not only absolute ruin to many Stockholders, and a loss of at least 50 per-
cent to the Bank's creditors, but also general and wide spread loss and disaster 
to the business of the entire province".66 However, nothing could be accom-
plished until the Hughes account in England was settled, and Louis H. Davies, 
bank director and provincial M LA, travelled to London to handle the account. 
The bank's statutory period for resumption was nearing its expiration date, and 
a delegation dispatched to Ottawa arranged a further extension of 90 days. In 
mid-April, the province was shocked by the news that hitherto undiscovered 
bank debts required an additional $300,000 to resume business. Before any 
action could be taken, news arrived from London that Hughes owed the bank 
$90,000 and had no means to repay it. All hopes of resumption evaporated, 
bankruptcy was unavoidable, and on 30 May 1882 a petition to wind up the 
bank was filed in court. 
The failure of this much-respected bank, which had been considered as solid 
and respectable as Government House, sent Shockwaves through the commun-
ity. The immediate impact was a loss of confidence in the security of the other 
banks, which resulted in a brief run on the two remaining Charlottetown institu-
tions. Because the Old Bank was heavily involved in promoting shipbuilding, 
fishing, breweries, starch and lobster factories, its collapse had a paralyzing 
effect on trade. Deposits in the government's Savings Bank increased dramati-
cally as the public apparently lost faith in all other banking institutions. This lost 
64 In camera examination of J. Longworth, ibid. 
65 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 19 January 1882; Examiner, 17 January 1882; Patriot, 2 February 
1882. 
66 Ibid. 
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trust was also reflected in the declining value of the Union Bank's stock.67 
Although the demise of one bank might have been considered a golden oppor-
tunity for the other financial houses to fill the void, it served, instead, to shake 
Islanders' confidence in the long-term possibilities of small local banks. In addi-
tion, the Old Bank was considerably in debt to the other banks which were un-
able to realize on their claims for several years, and even then, the Bank of 
Prince Edward Island paid only 60 cents on the dollar. 
These problems did not escape the notice of the Bank of Nova Scotia. While 
the Bank of Prince Edward Island was still exploring the possibility of re-open-
ing, the Nova Scotian directors met in Halifax to consider the benefits of amal-
gamation with "several small country banks in the lower provinces" which were 
experiencing difficulties.68 
It is unclear which institution approached the other, but both sides agreed to 
amalgamation by mid-1882. From the Bank of Nova Scotia's viewpoint, merger 
offered definite economic advantages. According to the Halifax press, amal-
gamation would "place the Bank of N.S. at once in possession of the best busi-
ness on the Island without cost, and add to the many ties of mutual interest 
between the two provinces and will make the interests of the business men of the 
Island lie rather with Nova Scotia than with New Brunswick".69 Additionally, 
the Union Bank's provincial charter enabled it to issue bank notes and grant 
loans up to three times its paid-up capital. As this charter did not expire until 
1891, the Bank of Nova Scotia could expand its note issue, previously fixed by 
Dominion law to the extent of the bank's capital. Although the Union Bank of 
Prince Edward Island was in sound financial shape, the failure of the Old Bank 
had apparently convinced the directors of the long-term benefits of a merger 
with a stronger institution. After a year of negotiations, and the passage of a 
special Act of Parliament, the two banks amalgamated on 2 October 1883. The 
amalgamation of the Union Bank with the Bank of Nova Scotia in 1883 evoked 
the following hopeful comment from the Examiner. 
The power of a certain class of influential men to extort undue accom-
modation from the local Boards of Bank Directors will be diminished, and 
the careful, laborious, prospering small trader will have a better chance to 
obtain the accommodation he may require when jealous and inimical large 
traders no longer exercise control at Board of Bank Directors.70 
The Merchants Bank also suffered from the collapse of the Old Bank. The 
bank had never recovered from its 1878 losses, and after a brief resurgence in 
1881-82, notes, deposits, and loans declined the next year to the level of the dark 
67 Summerside Journal, 30 March 1882; Cundall Diary, Spring 1882, PAPEI. 
68 Report of Annual General Meeting, 15 February 1882, Minute Book, Bank of Nova Scotia 
Archives, Toronto. 
69 New Era, 15 September 1883, quoted in the Patriot, 19 September 1883. 
70 Examiner, 13 September 1883. 
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days of 1878. In May 1883 a committee of influential Charlottetown merchants 
recommended that the bank discontinue operations, and the directors decided to 
sell.71 Negotiations began with five off-Island banks, but the only positive offer 
came from the Bank of Nova Scotia, which the directors rejected as insufficient. 
The 1884 annual general meeting replaced all but one of the directors and asked 
shareholders to donate a sum equal to 40 per cent of their holdings to eliminate 
the bank's deficits. The new board consisted of prominent Charlottetown im-
porters, retailers, and shipowners, including four previous Union Bank direc-
tors. According to Victor Ross, "most of the influential men of the island...both 
in business and in public office, were interested in the Bank as directors or share-
holders, and controlling as they did, a large part of the trade of the island, they 
turned it into the Merchants Bank".72 
During the next two decades, the Merchants Bank enjoyed considerable 
success. By 1905 its assets had risen to more than $2 million, circulating notes 
increased to $311,000, and dividends had remained at eight per cent from 1888. 
Branches were established in Souris (1884), Montague Bridge (1897), Summer-
side (1899), Alberton (1899), and Sydney, Cape Breton (1900). When the 
Canada Bank Act and the large Central Canadian banks forced the Farmers' 
Bank of Rustico to liquidate in 1894, and the Bank of Summerside amal-
gamated with the Bank of New Brunswick in 1901, the Merchants Bank re-
mained the only local bank on the Island. In 1906, however, its shareholders 
voted to merge with the Canadian Bank of Commerce. 
During the previous eight years, the Merchants Bank had lost three presidents 
and one vice-president to death or retirement. Losses from bad debts had been 
gradually mounting, and competition from Central Canadian branch banks was 
increasing. By 1905 the Bank of Nova Scotia, the Union Bank of Halifax, and 
the Bank of New Brunswick had all established branches in Charlottetown, and 
the total number of branch banks on the Island had grown from six in 1895 to 14 
in 1906. From the Merchants Bank's perspective, amalgamation with the pow-
erful Canadian Bank of Commerce would provide better returns, and would 
protect its shareholders from drastic shifts in the economy. For the Canadian 
Bank of Commerce, this was a chance to establish banking facilities in one of 
the two provinces in which it was not represented. The move to the Island was 
also part of the bank's expansionist policy in which total branches had grown 
from 48 in 1900 to 152 in 1906.73 
Prince Edward Islanders had mixed feelings about branch banking. The Ex-
aminer had favoured the Union Bank's merger with the Bank of Nova Scotia, 
but cautioned against permitting non-Islanders to monopolize provincial bank-
ing, because "outside interests more powerful than the interests of the Island 
may, at times, influence the policy they may adopt with reference to our 
71 Ross, The Canadian Bank of Commerce, p. 145. 
72 Ibid., p. 148. 
73 Annual Reports for the City of Charlottetown, 1889-1906; R.M. Breckenridge, The Canadian 
Banking System, 1817-1890 (Toronto, 1894), p. 310; Canadian Annual Review, 1906, p. 205. 
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people".74 The Summerside Journal expressed similar sentiments during the 
Bank of Prince Edward Island's troubles in 1882. If the Bank of Montreal pur-
chased the Old Bank's charter, the editor wrote, "we should regard it a misfor-
tune for our other banks to be exposed to the operations of so great and soulless 
a corporation".75 This attitude was also reflected in the Merchants Bank's 1892 
decision to prohibit non-residents from becoming directors. 
Yet when the last Island bank merged with the Canadian Bank of Commerce 
in 1906, the local press hailed the transaction. The Guardian hoped the amal-
gamation would turn "the eyes of the capitalists to this province, and [give] a 
great stimulus to the much needed development of our rich agricultural re-
sources". The creation of an advisory board of local businessmen with a "large 
measure of discretion" in conducting the branch's lending policies, probably 
accounted for these sentiments.76 These sanguine expectations were never ful-
filled. The growth of branch banking resulted in the gradual decline of Prince 
Edward Island's financial facilities. In 1881, at the height of local banking, each 
branch served an average of 9,900 Islanders, the highest ratio recorded in Can-
ada. Ten years later, each branch served more than 13,600 individuals. Although 
the ratio of branches to people improved slightly over the following two decades, 
Prince Edward Island enjoyed fewer banking services than any province but 
Quebec.77 
R.T. Naylor has stated that the extension of the Central Canadian branch 
banking system into the Maritimes undermined indigenous banks and diverted 
savings previously used to sustain local development to the continent's more 
profitable areas.78 James Frost's examination of the Bank of Nova Scotia's ratio 
of loans to deposits has substantiated Naylor's thesis for this Halifax bank.79 
The following analysis tends to corroborate these findings in the case of Prince 
Edward Island. 
One method of examining the benefits of branch banking in a specific region 
is to determine the ratio of loans to deposits. When loans at least equal deposits 
(a ratio of 1.00), the community's savings are being invested locally; but if the 
ratio declines below 1.00, savings are being diverted from the area. Table Two 
shows the available loan-deposit ratios for the Union Bank both before and after 
amalgamation with the Bank of Nova Scotia. Prior to amalgamation, the Union 
Bank loaned approximately $1.55 to local residents for every $1.00 it received in 
deposits. After becoming a Bank of Nova Scotia branch, it loaned only 78 cents 
locally for every dollar deposited. The 22 cents difference, plus the additional 
74 Examiner, 13 September 1883. 
75 Summerside Journal, 2 February 1882. 
76 Guardian, 2 June 1906; Examiner, 1 June 1906. The Advisory Board was abolished in 1915. 
77 Ron Rudin, "Quebec and the Canadian Banking System, 1871-1921", paper presented at the 
meetings of the Canadian Historical Association, Vancouver, 1983. 
78 Naylor, History of Canadian Business, I, pp. 103-4, 118-25. 
79 James D. Frost, "The 'Nationalization' of the Bank of Nova Scotia, 1880-1910", Acadiensis, 
XII, 1 (Autumn 1982), pp. 3-38. 
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1.40 
1.51 
.85 
1.20 
.89 
.75 
.61 
.36 
Union 
Union 
Union 
Branch of B.N.S 
B.N.S. 
B.N.S. 
B.N.S. 
B.N.S. 
B.N.S. 
Table Two 
Ratio of Total Loans to Deposits in the Union Bank/Bank of Nova Scotia 
Year Ratio Bank 
1866 
1874 
1875 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1889 
1905 
1910 
Sources: P.E.I., Journal of the Legislative Council, 1866-75; J.D. Frost, 
'"Principles of Interest': The Bank of Nova Scotia and the Industrialization of 
the Maritimes, 1880-1910", M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1978, Appendix. 
funds generated by the bank's three to one fractional reserve system, floated to 
areas of superior potential profits. The scattered ratios shown in Table Three 
represent different banks at various times, and therefore cannot be used as a 
reliable guide. They do, however, suggest that branch banks did not invest as 
substantially in Prince Edward Island as did locally-owned institutions. Both 
Island banks, for example, invested twice as many funds per deposit as did the 
two externally controlled financial institutions. 
The banks did not deny that surplus funds were being transferred from east to 
west; indeed, they considered it a wise precaution both in terms of business 
acumen and national prosperity. The General Manager of the Canadian Bank of 
Commerce argued: 
The Bank of Montreal borrows money from depositors at Halifax and 
many points in the Maritime Provinces, where the savings largely exceed 
the new enterprises, and it lends money in Vancouver or in the North-west, 
where the new enterprises far exceed the people's savings. In what other 
country is such a splendid development of banking to be seen as that in-
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volved in transferring the idle money of the Atlantic towns and cities to the 
new centres of enterprise on the Pacific?80 
It would be pointless to condemn the bank's lending practices for responding to 
more profitable business opportunities elsewhere. The low Island loan to deposit 
ratio merely reflected the lesser demand and potential returns for invested funds 
on the Island than existed elsewhere. These tentative statistics point to the need 
for further research on how banking policy influenced the Island's economy. To 
what extent were Island businessmen unable to secure loans at reasonable bank 
rates in the wake of the outflow of local savings? Did branch banks play a posi-
tive or negative role in Prince Edward Island's economy, and how responsive 
were they to the needs of the province's business community? 
When the first bank began operations on Prince Edward Island in 1856, its 
directors announced that the institution's objectives were to secure a fair return 
on the stockholders' investments, and "to afford every facility for the develop-
ment of the commercial and agricultural resources of this Colony".81 The other 
two Charlottetown banks emerged for similar reasons. In all three institutions, 
shareholders had little reason to complain. In a period when interest rates 
ranged between four and seven per cent, and the banks' discounting rate was 
seven to eight per cent, the Bank of P.E.I, returned an average of 11 per cent be-
tween 1865 and 1877; and despite eight depressed years, the Merchants Bank's 
dividends averaged over seven per cent. More importantly, the local banks pro-
vided a healthier climate for business investments than had existed prior to the 
1850s. They regularized the monetary system, retained specie on the Island, and 
issued up to $700,000 in currency for business transactions. The banks provided 
a reliable source of credit at reasonable rates, and helped to direct the com-
munity's surplus funds into remunerative channels. The steady growth in total 
assets, deposits, and loans attested to the growing popularity and expanding 
activities of the three Charlottetown banks. The local financial institutions facil-
itated the movement of staples to external markets, and loaned substantial sums 
of money to support shipbuilding, lobster and meat canning, starch manufactur-
ing, electricity generation, and a host of other secondary business enterprises. 
The banks also had their flaws. Their policies on credit expansion and con-
traction were more likely to prolong economic downturns than retard them. 
Favouritism in the treatment of clients also characterized the early banks. Fur-
thermore the directors' failure to properly oversee the banks' lending and credit 
activities precipitated several crises that shook the public's confidence, and con-
tributed to the entry and acceptance of outside institutions. Island bank direc-
tors became involved in banking for the benefits that would accrue to their busi-
nesses, rather than from an interest in banking itself. Few directors had training 
in accounting, and the cashiers and one or two directors frequently had free 
80 Quoted in Canada, Statistical Year-Book of Canada (Ottawa, 1894), pp. 644-5. 
81 Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 3 March 1857, PAPEI. 
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Table Three 
Ratio of Loans to Deposits in Various Island Banks, 1859-1910 
Bank of 
BankofN.S. New Brunswick 
Summerside Charlottetown 
Bank of P.E.I. Merchants Bank Branch Branch 
Year 
1859 
1860 
1873 
1875 
1877 
1879 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1896 
1901 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
Ratio 
1.84 
3.23 
Ratio 
2.27 
1.53 
1.63 
6.59 
2.04 
1.80 
2.71 
2.14 
2.77 
3.23 
3.57 
2.99 
2.66 
2.76 
2.88 
2.49 
3.05 
1.59 
1.68 
Ratio 
1.35 
1.10 
1.49 
2.00 
1.74 
1.10 
.76 
.70 
.66 
.69 
1.13 
.32 
.13 
Ratio 
.79 
1.03 
.94 
1.11 
1.07 
Sources: Calculated from Bank of P.E.I. Minute Book, 1859-82; Bank of New 
Brunswick records, Bank of Nova Scotia Archives; Frost, '"Principles of 
Interest"', Appendix C; Ross, Bank of Commerce, Vol. I, p. 492. 
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rein with the institutions' lending policies. The haphazard use of the banks' 
funds went unnoticed during the prosperous 1860s and 1870s, but when eco-
nomic conditions deteriorated, Charlottetown's banks were hard-pressed to re-
main solvent. The Bank of Prince Edward Island's failure in 1882 alerted the 
other city banks to the dangers of a fluctuating economy, and the possible bene-
fits of merging with larger institutions. The Union Bank promptly amalgamated 
with the Bank of Nova Scotia, whereas the Merchants Bank, unable to procure 
a suitable offer at the time, continued operations until its merger with the Cana-
dian Bank of Commerce in 1906. 
This study suggests that banking operations on Prince Edward Island may be 
divided into two distinct phases, with the depression of 1878 serving as the 
watershed. During the prosperous 1856-1877 period, when the economy thrived 
and interest rates remained high, local banking facilities satisfied the needs of 
the Island business community. The depression of the late 1870s destroyed the 
local banks' effectiveness and inaugurated the era of branch banking operations. 
Branch banking fulfilled only one of the Island's two historic fiscal needs. 
Deposits were more secure than before; but the business community's appetite 
for operating cash, the Island's other fiscal requirement, could not be satisfied 
by a banking system that relied on national rather than local profitability cri-
teria. The integration of Prince Edward Island into Canada's national financial 
system thus dramatizes the need of hinterland regions for banking facilities that 
can meet the local fiscal demands regardless of the cyclical ups and downs that 
characterize the state of the larger economy to which they belong. 
